When Is a Man not a Man?: Deconstructive and Reconstructive Impulses in Finnegans Wake by Gillespie, Michael  Patrick
When Is a Man not a Man?: Deconstructive and 
Reconstructive Impulses in Finnegans Wake 
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The question of Shem the Penman that opens chapter seven of Finnegans 
Wake—When is a man not a man—and the range of answers that it elicits, rep-
resents just one of many instances in which phenomenological pursuits and 
the concomitant inadequacy of terms come to the foreground of Joyce's work. 
No matter whom one reads, however, in any given situation labels / signifiers / 
designations more often than not generate as much ambiguity as certitude. 
The following quotations, for example, come from works by two of the men 
most often linked to British Modernism—T.S. Eliot and James Joyce, yet a 
scrutiny of either author immediately raises doubts about the efficacy of such a 
characterization: "In my beginning is my end" (T.S. Eliot); "A way a lone a last a 
loved a long the . . . riverrun, past Eve and Adam's, from swerve of shore to 
bend of bay, brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth 
Castle and Environs" (James Joyce). Neither writer is British, and the quota-
tions cited reflect markedly different aesthetic assumptions from those com-
monly singled out as traits of Modernist writing. 
Nonetheless, the connection to Modernism serves as a useful benchmark 
for viewing both Eliot and Joyce, even as their lives and their works continue to 
call the range < of such a designation into question. The line from "Burnt 
Norton" that appears above certainly intensifies this perception of ambiguity. 
It enforces the idea that, for all of the easy associations that one makes be-
tween Eliot's earliest published poetry (Prufrock and Other Poems and The 
Waste Land) and the Modernist impulse, in his later work he had no power (or 
perhaps more precisely no inclination) to resist the recidivist attractions of lin-
ear thinking. Similarly the conflated passages from Finnegans Wake quoted 
above (the final line of that work elided with its opening) enforce Joyce's evolu-
tion from a Modern to a Postmodern writer. As one contemplates the late ver-
sions of both writers' works, one can see in Joyce a turn marking a dexterous in-
version of Eliot's perspective, showing that in the end of his last work one finds 
its beginning. Because of the connections that many make between Eliot, 
Joyce, and Modernism, these gestures stands as more than simply deft stylistic 
maneuvers. They imply epistemological assumptions inherent in the writings 
of both authors that readers, too much given to the power of labels, have 
proven extremely reluctant to acknowledge. 
I make these observations not from a desire to impose new designations 
upon either author or from a wish to disbar all use of labels in literary criticism. 
Rather I seek to raise questions about both the impulse to categorize and the 
subtle movement from the act of reading to that of interpreting, from appre-
hension to expression. Just as the specific designation of H on a faucet fixes 
only broad limits on the range of possible temperatures for the water that will 
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flow from the tap, labels introduced into any critical discourse can only set 
down, at best, wide parameters of shared discernment. As a consequence, they 
do not assure an analogous exchange of views. Rather, they merely delineate 
approximate areas of common understanding. Labels do not complete the dis-
course, but they do begin the process. Thus, we must treat them as kinetic ele-
ments and continually expand and refine the implications attached to them. 
Adopting such a perspective leads one to implications especially useful in 
reading works by an author like Joyce, whose writing vigorously resists interpre-
tation through exclusive, cause and effect correspondences. Finnegans Wake, 
for example, clearly was not written to please the Cartesian mind. Its cyclical 
and circular narrative contiguity contradicts the linear distinctions implied by 
the segmentation of chapters and parts. Furthermore, the overt multiple signi-
fication of its puns, portmanteau words, linguistic allusions, transliterations, 
and other syntactic devices intentionally disrupts consideration of meaning as 
a binary condition. Resistance to this diversity surfaces most strikingly in the 
unconscious bifurcation of the act of reading and the act of interpretation, and 
in seeking to reunite these divided concepts one comes towards a more so-
phisticated and richer response to the work. 
The division to which I refer stands less as a stark binary opposition than as 
a more subtle shift from one mode of emphasis to another. Even among the 
most open of post-Structuralist critics, including those most energetic in advo-
cating pluralistic views, one notes inclinations to produce prescriptive interpre-
tations that emphasize closure rather than contingency.1 Such a tone derives in 
part at least from the very nature of the critical process, but nonetheless di-
rectly conflicts with the openness of Finnegans Wake. The aim of this essay is 
to offer a strategy for resisting this drift towards closure. 
The movement from sensation to analysis transverses several stages, each 
with its own grammar and vocabulary distinct from every other state. Thus, in 
any discussion of an aesthetic experience, the transmission of that impression 
to others becomes really a translation, a shift from the idiosyncratic discourse 
of individual thoughts and feelings to the accepted patois of the critical pro-
fession. (A final transmutation occurs, of course, as the sensation passes from 
the general realm of critical analysis to enter the consciousness of each person 
who encounters it.) One can find this practice at work, in varying degrees, in 
any piece of literary criticism that one might choose to examine. Indeed, one 
might argue that all discourse reflects a translation of idiosyncratic apprehen-
sion into conventional signification, providing auditors with approximations 
rather than with duplications of the speakers' views. Nonetheless, critics gen-
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erally write as if the gap between personal sensation and public pronounce-
ment remained narrow and easy to bridge, devoting relatively little attention to 
exploring this divergence. 
This disjunction between our aesthetic apprehension and our interpretive 
endeavors has significance for any critical response that one might choose to 
examine, but here I will restrict myself to the space that develops between 
reading and interpretation as it applies to one's experience with Finnegans 
Wake. Paradoxically, the overt multiplicity of signification within the discourse 
of the work leads to the manifestation of strong impulses towards reduction as 
one moves from apprehension to expression. Personal comprehension of the 
Wake comes close to what one feels when listening to a musical composition 
or looking at a painting, with responses generally operating at the level of pure 
sensation. As long as these reactions remain private, our critical experience 
needs no mediating language. When we attempt to share our attitudes about 
the Wake in open discourse, however, a change occurs. The grammar of aca-
demic exchange conditions our views, and this results in the presentation of a 
work arguably different from the one that we have read. This occurs because 
the approximate nature of language continually disrupts efforts to produce in-
terpretive homogeneity while the protocols of criticism relentlessly enforce the 
need to affirm the certitude of any reading. As a consequence critics feel 
caught in an Alice-in-Wonderland world. They wish to remain open to the 
spontaneity of the work, but, perversely, they also fear that the credibility of 
their own assessments would suffer if they too closely paralleled the free-form 
contextual approach of Joyce's writing. 
I do not wish to imply that the Wake of necessity resists all efforts to form a 
unified interpretation of its aesthetic impact. To do so would be to assume the 
same posture of certitude that I am criticizing in others. Nonetheless, I do feel 
that the time has come to challenge the readings that apply conventional 
methodologies to an unconventional work. Those who have been reading 
Finnegans Wake with an unwavering faith in the existence of an ideal reading 
and in the possibility of discovering it may very well have important insights to 
offer. At the same time, given the shift in contemporary intellectual assump-
tions, I feel that they, like other critics, must now relinquish their privileged on-
tological position and precede each exegesis with a defense of hermeneutic 
principles.2 
My contention remains that Finnegans Wake demands a form of pattern-
ing that stands in opposition to traditional cause and effect thinking. Further, I 
believe that, no matter what pattern an individual reader chooses to impose, it 
can at best be implemented only as a provisional attempt at interpretation. 
Any other inclination would turn one towards reductivism. Given this condition, 
I would like to raise the question of how one advances a reading that does not 
succumb to easy generalization or to hasty leveling. 
M do not, of course, mean to imply that all critics of Finnegans Wake follow this approach. For a 
number of years the writings both of David Hayman and of Margot Noms, to name just two, have 
been characterized by a preference for multiplicity and a deferral of closure. 
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Specifically, I am interested in exploring how one acknowledges its range 
of alternatives rather than in how one can resolve all of its antinomies into a 
single interpretation. To those committed to traditional assumptions of literary 
criticism, my project must certainly seem, at the very least, anarchic and possi-
bly subjective to the point of being meaningless to anyone else. Nonetheless, 
the kinds of imaginative responses that Finnegans Wake provokes demand 
such a view.3 "In the buginning is the woid, in the muddle is the sounddance 
and thereinofter you're in the unbewised again, vund vulsyvolsy" (378. 29-31). 
Certainly, one can impose a linear reading on the above passage, but difficul-
ties arise from such a rendering. Not only does such a methodology not ex-
haust all of the potential meanings in a work (what approach does?), but it does 
not even capture the immediate personal experience of reading. Instead, what 
one has is an academically acceptable interpretation deaf to the invitations of 
the work to which it putatively responds. My methodology seeks to break the 
hegemony of the view giving primacy to a single reading by outlining a non-
conventional, nonlinear response that allows one to acknowledge the episodic 
associations that one derives from reading, rather than from explication, and to 
exploit the choices offered to one for forming a text for the work.4 
The approach to reading that I am advocating grows out of the view sug-
gested by critics like Roland Barthes of a text as a conceptualization of any of a 
vast number of potential responses inherent in a piece of art.5 I suspect that 
most of us already imitate Barthes by very adeptly adducing "writerly" texts 
fashioned from the freeplay of our imaginations, but we then deny this whole 
process by producing "readerly" criticism based on tightly reasoned arguments 
and allowing little room for variant opinions. Here, of course, I am translating 
Barthes's concepts of "scritible" and "lisible" and extending their scope 
through a separation of the acts of sensation and articulation, but the analogy 
remains. My aim quite simply lies in forming a methodology that allows one to 
maintain the "writerly" impulse throughout the interpretive process, resisting 
the drift towards closure that generally characterizes critical expression. 
I should assert here my position that one plays within a piece of art. That is 
to say one's imagination responds to the stimuli of the work. If one makes in-
terpretive claims about Finnegans Wake, then those claims must function 
d
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within generally held perceptions of the Wake. According to this logic, the 
piece of art itself acts as the ultimate validator of all claims to interpret it, and I 
am asserting that the structure of Finnegans Wake calls into question the effi-
cacy of the conventional hermeneutic assumptions of many of the interpreta-
tions now in the critical canon. 
An aversion to conventionality, however, does not inevitably lead to chaos, 
for Finnegans Wake like any work of art imposes very real interpretive con-
straints through the paradigm laid down by the elements that make up its nar-
rative discourse. The aesthetic features which define the creative limits of any 
imaginative representation of the material in Joyce's work—setting, characteri-
zation, tone, descriptive tenor, allusive associations, and any other aspects of 
the work that distinguish it from all other pieces of fiction-all play a part in this 
process. They invite wide-ranging responses to portions of the work without im-
posing the need to establish a continuity or a consistency from one segment to 
another or from one reading to another. At the same time, they establish a 
paradigm that invites one to construct these responses or texts within identifi-
able literal limits which the book lays down. The challenge for readers consists 
of delineating the paradigm and articulating options for responding to the work 
which fit logically into its limits. 
The approach that I am advocating, then, hinges upon two separate 
though complementary critical operations, both of which remain fluid and 
subjective. At the initial stage of aesthetic response, one acknowledges the 
breadth of the paradigm, the factor guiding interpretive response, laid down by 
the work. From this acknowledgment, one then goes on to create readings that 
do not step outside the limits delineated by the paradigm. I realize that such an 
approach intentionally succumbs to the subjectivity of language, but despite 
this inclination I do not wish to appear to advocate any gesture as prescriptive 
as defining or outlining. Rather, as I see it, any reader realizes that an interpre-
tation must accommodate the contingencies arising from the narrative, but 
many wish to suppress the overt subjectivity of this condition: these contin-
gencies do not and cannot exist outside the actual process of reading. 
In a critical analysis of the Ondt and the Gracehoper episode, for example, 
one can adduce a wide range of meanings, all of which stand as valid interpre-
tive contributions as long as they remain within the possible characterizations 
of the Ondt and the Gracehoper that emerge for other readers of the discourse, 
i.e., the response of the public always determines the validity of any public exe-
gesis. Those disturbed by this criticism by consensus ignore the fact that no 
criticism, either applied or theoretical, has ever moved forward without the 
overt approval of those exposed to it. Characterizations like those of the Ondt 
and the Gracehoper do not exist as Platonic ideals; they come into being only 
through the act of reading. As a result, one must continually reassess all efforts 
to articulate meaning in accordance with the evolving and subjective concept 
of the work that one entertains. Rather than stand as an impediment, however, 
a deeply idiosyncratic view becomes the basis for celebrating individuality 
while simultaneously sounding intellectual resonances within a broader critical 
community. It allows one to articulate responses to Finnegans Wake that do 
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not succumb to the constraints of linear, cause-and-effect thinking nor to the 
anarchy of private discourse. 
As noted above, this whole approach emphasizes an open-ended act of in-
quiring without investing any intellectual capital in the need for resolution. It 
advances instead an epistemology that eschews hermeneutic closure as the 
basis for aesthetic satisfaction. Instead, this methodology features the freeplay 
of the imagination (to borrow another concept from Barthes) as its central criti-
cal gesture. While Finnegans Wake provides numerous invitations to the 
reader to undertake alternative lines of interrogation, the key to full participa-
tion with artistic features of the work remains taking an open-ended view of the 
entire process. 
One specific instance in chapter six exactly illustrates my point. Although 
Joyce overtly organized the whole chapter around interrogation, the ambiguity 
of the twelfth question and answer, compressed into just two lines, highlights 
possibilities for the approach that I am advocating. 
12. Sacer estol 
Answer: Semus sumusl (168.13-14) 
Through a binary structure, both clearly defined and at the same time open to 
multiple interpretations, it illustrates precisely the type of interpretive re-
sponses that one could reasonably expect to make throughout the entire work. 
The question itself, with its ambiguous Latin construction, demands 
translation before one proceeds further. Despite the directness of its verb, the 
accompanying adjective proves anomalous. It could be glossed as asking "Are 
you sacred," or it could, with equally sound logical support, be rendered as "Are 
you damned." The answer that follows reflects the same kinds of possibilities 
with one version being "We are the same" and another "We are Shem." The 
point is not that we as readers must settle on one meaning or another. Rather 
the lines show how a series of options shape an emerging aesthetic experience 
even before formal interpretation begins. While the passage offers a range of 
possible apprehensions inherent in the words that one considers, any interpre-
tation that develops necessarily remains under the influence of the paradigm 
of the work. In this respect this selection functions microcosmically. More than 
a preview of the discourse that follows, the question and answer that close 
chapter six suggests an appropriate posture, an intellectual orientation for 
reading subsequent chapters, especially for the next one dealing with the dis-
section of Shem the Penman. 
For linear thinkers, those lines, emblematic of the rest of the book, seem to 
tell us too little by telling us too much. Stylistically, they disrupt cause and ef-
fect thinking by a paratactic strategy, replacing the either/or approach of 
common interrogation with the both/and condition characterizing the Wake.6 
Thematically, they collapse the distance between reader and character, not by 
See especially David Hayman's Re-Formmg the Narrative: Toward a Mechanics of Modernist 
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6 The International Fiction Review 18.1 (1991) 
producing a conflation of essence, for with an apparent antipathy for meta-
physics they call into question the very concept of absolutes. (I say apparently 
to avoid reductive assumptions, for the discourse of the Wake also shows little 
inclination to support the reification of abstractions.) Rather, these lines, and 
others with similar characteristics throughout the book, insinuate an equiva-
lence of consciousnesses and highlight the multiplicity of interpretation inher-
ent in any experience. 
Such possibilities for construing form and content contribute to the am-
bivalence that becomes the operating emotion for anyone reading Finnegans 
Wake, but too often traditional attitudes exert disruptive pressure. The im-
pulse to impose closure can create a counterforce that inclines one to move 
outside the limits of the paradigm laid down by the work. Perhaps in anticipa-
tion of such temptations, the discourse at various points underscores the tenu-
ousness of all perceptions. "Thus the unfacts, did we possess them, are too im-
precisely few to warrant our certitude, the evidencegivers by legpoll too un-
trustworthily irreperible where his ajudgers are seemingly freak threes by his 
judicandees plainly minus twos" (57. 16-19). Inevitably, readers struggling 
against the domination of exclusive, linear thinking need such periodic re-
minders to reassure us that feeling a measure of bafflement remains a neces-
sary and proper aspect of our experience and that certitude does not enjoy a 
privileged position in all critical expression. 
The aspects of reading that I have outlined above do not recur in discrete 
episodic instances. Instead they run throughout the discourse and provide a 
structural unity and continuity that one does not find at the contextual or stylis-
tic level. Thus, it inevitably develops that, while the final portion of chapter six 
underscores the sense of ambivalence surrounding any segment of the Wake, 
chapter seven extends the proposition to argue for the desirability of such a 
condition. It begins with a broad question—"the first riddle of the universe . . . 
when is a man not a man" (170.04-05)-and a series of answers analogous to the 
range of responses that any number of readers might make to one of the 
book's episodes. This question and the thirteen attempted solutions that fol-
lows may or may not trace an archetypal search for understanding, but the ex-
change certainly evokes a sense of the variability characterizing the individual 
readings of the discourse of the Wake. 
No answer achieves a privileged status, for as the narrative tells us, "All 
were wrong" (170. 21-22). At the same time, by this point in the book, the dis-
course has so often undermined absolutes that concepts like correct and incor-
rect have lost their significance. More to the point, since not one of these an-
swers proves itself more efficacious than any of the others, a reader may pur-
sue the implications of one as well as another. Freeplay rather than prescrip-
tiveness becomes the rule. 
This is not to say that one should assume intellectual postures analogous 
to those held by the respondents to Shem's riddle. Although the prize for the 
correct solution, "a bittersweet crab," calls to mind a pre-lapsarian image of the 
Edenic fruit from the tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, the answers of 
the brothrons and sweestureens hardly represent a very deep or broad testing 
Finnegans Wake 7 
of the metaphysical conceit that the riddle invites us to form. Among other 
things, their replies illustrate the flawed perceptions and degraded conditions 
directly resulting from humanity's fall from grace: drunkenness, "when the 
wine's at witsends"; lust, "when lovely wooman stoops to conk him"; old 
age/'when you are old I'm grey fall full wi sleep"; the subversion of reality, 
"when dose pigs they begin now that they will flies up intil the looft"; and death 
itself, "when the angel of death kicks the bucket of life." They taunt us with our 
secret fears and insecurities: castration, "when he is just only after having being 
semisized"; a loss of Faith, "when he is a gnawstick"; and a loss of all prospects, 
"when yea, he hath no mananas." And sardonically, they call to mind past 
losses while predicting an apocalyptic future: the expulsion from Eden, "when 
he yeat ye abblokooken and he zmear hezelf zo zhooken"; and the end of the 
world, "when the heavens are quakers" (170.09-21). An obvious paradox obtains 
here. With the emphasis on degeneration, the individual answers betray a nar-
rowness in their point of view coming out of a linear sense of the inevitable de-
cline of the human condition. At the same time, the cumulative diversity of the 
replies encourages readers to continue to seek a pattern for legitimizing multi-
plicity in reading. After this digressiveness, a linear mode of thinking would 
wish to come to some sort of resolution in the putatively correct answer—correct 
in the sense of being officially sanctioned—that Shem supplies for the riddle. 
His solution, however, infers an equally broad range of alternatives for seeing 
the world, "when he is a—yours till the rending of the rocks—Sham" (170.23-24). 
At first glance this response may strike one as little more than a weak 
punchline for a rather elaborate joke, reminiscent of the ill-conceived riddle 
about the fox and his grandmother that Stephen Dedalus tells in the Nestor 
chapter of Ulysses.71 believe, however, that such an interpretation takes too 
much at face value. To me, Shem's answer suggests the most lucid approach to 
the entire chapter. In seeing the thing that is/is not in the thing that is not/is, it 
rejects certitude in favor of potentiality, leaving worth open to interpretation. 
To return to a point made earlier, it strikes me as significant that the narra-
tive offers this multiplicity in both the "right" and the "wrong" answers. In its 
own fashion the discourse reminds us that within the epistemology of 
Finnegans Wake the act of responding takes on much greater importance 
than does a particular response. The narrative introduces a familiar linear 
structure—the question and answer exchange—but it then inverts all our expec-
tations regarding this form. If the predictability of the values of interrogative 
exchanges emerges as so uncertain, the value of other assumptions that we 
bring to interpretive projects becomes equally uncertain. As a result, by fore-
grounding multiplicity and provisionality in the discourse, Finnegans Wake 
actively discourages the closure and the certitude of conventional criticism. 
Joyce's narrative, however, does not stop there. Indulging in the possibili-
ties of pluralism, it proves unwilling to allow a single meaning to sustain the in-
A detailed account of this and other riddles employed in Joyce's narrative can be found in Patrick 
McCarthy's The Riddles of Finnegans Wake. Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck: Farleigh Dickinson Press; 
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terpretation of a word. As a consequence of this play of signification, interpreta-
tion evolves in a hypostatic environment. Each acknowledged meaning of a 
particular word counters, without refuting, all previous meanings (a gesture 
that in essence illustrates Jacques Derrida's concept of sous rature). This, in 
turn, expands one's parameters for reading—both/and meanings coexisting in 
place of the either/or struggle of linear cognition—even as it establishes the 
paradigm in which these alternatives coexist. 
A simple examination of the implications that adhere to the term sham il-
lustrates this operation at work. We commonly think of a sham as something 
or someone who pretends to be more or less than he/she/it is. In Shem's case, 
the narrator has tried to narrow the possible significations for an assessment of 
his character with a qualifying adjective—a low sham. Nonetheless, as we can 
see by forming the original question and answers into a brief syllogism, the 
scope of consideration remains significantly broad: 
a. A man is not a man when he is a sham. 
b. Shem is a sham. 
c. Shem is not a man. 
Epistemologically, such a conclusion leads us to the questions which take up 
the remainder of chapter seven: who then is Shem and how literally can one 
take what he says. The apparent contradiction (in terms of linear logic) inher-
ent in the syllogism, however, provokes an expanded ontological inquiry. 
By this point in Finnegans Wake, undercutting has become a characteriz-
ing feature of the narrative. From the opening pages, the discourse has refused 
to extend to readers the security of certitude. Now the discourse routinely in-
tensifies alternative readings whenever the formal or contextual structure of 
the narrative appears to be moving towards closure. "Who can say how many 
pseudostylic shamiana, how few or how many of the most venerated public im-
postures, how very many piously forged palimpsests slipped in the first place 
by this morbid process from his pelagiarist pen?" (181. 36-182. 03) In any 
episode an erosion of the reader's initial expectations quickly sets in. Thus, 
even the contingency-fraught approach of the exchange between Shem and 
the "brothron" and "sweestureens" in the opening question and answer format 
seems too pat, and the narrative voice immediately counterpoints Shem's dis-
quisition by underscoring the broad association between his own nature and 
the human qualities in solution to the riddle that he has just proposed: "Shem 
was a sham and a low sham and his lowness creeped out first via foodstuffs" 
(170.25-26). 
In the above characterization of Shem, one can find an unmistakably bi-
nary oscillation. The deconstruction that occurs in the first half of the sentence-
-Shem's apparent essence undermined as a false representation—flows seam-
lessly/ seemlessly into an analogous reconstruction—Shem as constituted by 
the foods he eats. At the same time, the paradigm of the Wake refuses to sus-
tain the equilibrium of even so rudimentary a system of balances. Instead, the 
discourse almost immediately begins to offer possibilities for interpretation ly-
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ing well beyond the modest restrictions on the reader's creation of a text pro-
posed by the association of Shem and food. 
With only the briefest pause to define Shem through synecdoche, the nar-
rative moves from assessing incipient dissimulation to gathering support for its 
conclusions from gustatory evidence. The jump may initially seem a conces-
sion to cause-and-effect thinking, but as it develops its extravagance under-
mines any prescriptive logic generated out of associative patterning. "So low 
was he that he preferred Gibsen's teatime salmon tinned, as inexpensive as 
pleasing, to the plumpest roeheavy lax or the friskiest parr or smolt troutlet that 
ever was gaffed between Leixlip and Island Bridge and many was the time he 
repeated in his botulism that no junglegrown pineapple ever smacked like the 
whoppers you shook out of Ananais' cans, Findlater and Gladstone's, Corner 
House, England. None of your inchthick blueblooded Balaclava fried-at-belief-
stakes or juice-jelly legs of the Grex's molten mutton or greasily-gristly grun-
ters' goupons or slice upon slab of luscious goosebosom with lump after load of 
plumppudding stuffing all aswin in a swamp of bogoakgravy for that greeken-
hearted yude! Rosbif of Old Zealand! he could not attouch it" (170. 26-171. 02). 
Like all of the other characters in the discourse, the narrator functions in a 
system perpetually at odds with the logic meant to sustain it. As a consequence, 
the narrative continues the pattern of linear thinking established by the broth-
ron and the sweestureens with an unswervingly literal devotion to the logic of 
its argument. The narrative voice labels Shem a sham, assuming this to mean 
that Shem is less than a man, and it then attempts to support this assumption 
through analogies to what it considers to be hard facts. These associations, 
however, seem unnecessarily circumscribed. Like a frenetic health food addict, 
the narrator labels as spurious any source of nutrition that has suffered the 
mediating influence of human intervention, adhering to this convention in a 
manner so unflinching as to call the validity of the basic premise into question. 
At the same time, the nature of this discourse outlines important features of 
the reading experience, so by following the logic of the argument, one can bet-
ter become aware of the alternatives characterizing Shem's nature without 
subscribing to the narrator's conclusion. As elsewhere in the Wake, the scope 
of signification that a reader is prepared to extend to words directly shapes the 
interpretive possibilities that one might derive from the selection, and a less 
rigid response to the potential meaning of this passage would produce a very 
different interpretation. 
If, in fact, we are what we eat, then Shem must be a most artificial (if well-
preserved) creature. This obviously stands as a flaw in the eyes of the narrator, 
for the narrative voice quickly makes clear its own narrow sense of the word ar-
tificial by condemning Shem for preferring canned food to the completely or-
ganic delicacies found in Ireland. Nonetheless, in fixing upon this interpreta-
tion, the narrative dismisses him precipitously. Shem does opt for artificial 
nourishment, but given his nature one could hardly count that as a flaw. As a 
writer Shem the Penman lives on artifice and presumably hopes that his cre-
ations will be preserved. It seems only natural then that he feel drawn to mate-
rial transmuted to give it a degree of permanence that it did not previously 
enjoy. One certainly can characterize Shem's diet as artificial, but only insofar 
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as the natural elements of the food he ingests have been supplemented so as 
to insure their constitutive integrity for a longer period. This, of course, involves 
some change, but in general the natural and artificial combine for their mutual 
benefit. Artifice stands at the center of art, and if anything it serves to enhance 
rather than to diminish one's aesthetic experience. 
The narrator, of course, takes a very different perspective, asserting that 
the only thing that one can say with assurance regarding Shem is that he is not 
the figure whom we perceive before us, yet that characterizes things a bit too 
simply. One might, with greater precision, view Shem as not merely the figure 
whom we perceive before us. Shem's character, in fact, displays a protean na-
ture that does not submit to easy categorization. In essence, he personifies a 
feature becoming increasingly common in critical discourse. 
In an essay written fairly early in his career, Derrida offered what has by 
now become a fairly familiar tenet of post-Structuralist criticism. He delineated 
the signified as encompassed by the tension between it and that which it is not, 
with Derrida considering what it is not as having the same level of importance 
as what it is.8 Since making that observation, Derrida and much of his 
Deconstructionist project have come under harsh criticism. Nonetheless, with 
the obvious Postmodern implications intruding upon Shem's condition, his 
work still offers a useful model for delimiting its features.9 For the individual 
aware of such antinomies, the statement—Shem is not a man—can have signifi-
cance only through some association between Shemness and manness. 
Asserting that Shem is not a man makes sense to us only as long as we keep the 
concept of manness in the foreground of our perception of Shemness. In this 
passage negations contribute to one's sense of definition, becoming as much a 
part of our perception of entity as concrete attributes, and we read the selec-
tion unimpeded by the limitations of linear causality. 
The difficulty occurs when one tries to maintain this openness in interpre-
tation. In chapter seven the narrator operates according to exclusionary 
thinking, and jumps to the conclusion produced by cause-and-effect logic that 
being not a man is a failing. Someone more conscious of the potential for play 
inherent in the situation, a critic like Barthes for example, would quite properly 
defer any such conclusion, dwelling instead on the alternatives—both superior 
and inferior—to being a man. At the same time, neither Barthes nor for that 
matter any post-Structuralist critic sympathetic to the tenets of nonbinary logic 
would wish to relinquish the concept of man, since it stands as the formative 
proposition that animates all possible alternatives. Following the logic of this 
approach, one can say that we can only perceive Shem as not a man (assuming 
of course that we accept the validity of the narrator's judgment) when we think 
of him in terms of being a man. And, if we subscribe to the sense of shamming 
8
 See Jacques Derrida, "Difference," in Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory 
of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) 129-60. 
' While this perspective clearly needs further elaboration, I do not agree with inferences made by some 
of Derrida's more frenetic opponents that embracing such a condition irreversibly commits one to 
entropie decay. Two examples of this approach would be Howard Felperin; Beyond Deconstruction 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), and John M. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (Princeton : Princeton 
University Press, 1989). 
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suggested above, we cannot say whether it would be more desirable for Shem 
to remain in his present condition or for him to become more or less manly. 
All this still leaves the Cartesian in the dark as to the essence of Shem, but 
that, of course, remains the point. Far from being a circumlocution, this type of 
analysis underscores the ambivalence inherent in any process of naming, in 
any effort at discrimination. Recognizing this condition of ambiguity in the de-
scription of Shem can reconcile us to similar dialectical equilibriums through-
out the work: instances of both/and thinking displacing the either/or approach. 
As a result of this condition none of the thirteen incorrect guesses in chapter 
seven brings about a rapprochement of the breach in comprehension precipi-
tated by the original question. Each attempts to consider a specific existence 
through isolation and denial, so that each suggests that one can determine 
when a man is not a man by defining a specific condition that undermines 
manliness. Each view remains unsatisfactory, however, because none can unify 
the diverse attitudes articulated by all of the others. In contrast, the apparent 
circumlocutions of Shem's answer give it the qualities that make it so appropri-
ate: a man is not a man when he only pretends to be what he is not. By denying 
the desirability of closure, this gesture has a liberating effect. It overturns the 
hegemony of a single response, and it introduces a way of thinking that allows 
for a multiplicity of readings. Further, the discourse refuses to conform to a lin-
ear logical progression within each statement, and through this refusal it un-
dermines the legitimacy of the logical argument that supports the narrative 
voice's attacks on Shem. 
The point that I hope to make through these associations has a circularity 
analogous to the text from which it was derived, which in turn maintains affini-
ties to the printed passage that enabled that text's creation. This pattern of de-
ferring meaning runs through every stage of one's experience with Finnegans 
Wake, yet it remains the aesthetic feature most difficult to retain. Reading the 
Wake continually exposes one to assaults on cause-and-effect thinking, yet 
after an initial furor that the work aroused in the 1920s and 1930s few serious 
students have dismissed the structure of the discourse out of hand. In other 
words, we have come to accept the lack of linearity that we encounter on its 
printed pages. To a degree the texts that we constitute from those pages retain 
this sense of multiplicity, as we playfully impose any number of intermingled 
scenarios upon our sense of a particular episode. In the final stage of the criti-
cal process, however, when we must commit our views to public scrutiny, we 
draw back from diversity to generate exclusive, stratified and prescriptive in-
terpretations. 
The discourse, at the same time, repeatedly offers models for overcoming 
this inclination. Shem's own act of creation, for example, centers on the recon-
stitution of basic organic material into a more artificial state even as he blithely 
ignores cultural proscriptions on his creative tools. By rendering the account of 
this project (185.14-25) into Latin, the discourse initially distances us from the 
coarseness of the operation (changing feces and urine into writing ink).10 
Robert Boyle's reading of p. 185 remains the most useful introduction to this passage. "Finnegans 
Wake, Page 185: an Explication," James Joyce Quarterly 4 (Fall 1966): 3-16. 
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Ultimately, however, this format has just the opposite effect, drawing us more 
intimately into the elemental structure. As we translate the terms from Latin to 
English, we necessarily concentrate on the prose one word at a time, lingering 
over phrases that we would have read far more quickly had they initially ap-
peared in a more accessible form. Further, although the passage's use of Latin 
and its concern for change seem initially to evoke the Eucharist, in fact these 
elements secularize (but do not travesty) the act of consecration in the Catholic 
Mass. Rather than setting up the narrative of the Wake as a static icon, these 
associations draw parallels between the Eucharist and the transformation of 
impersonal words into the language of his own art. 
Like transubstantiated bread and wine, the literal accidents—the shape of 
the letters—remain unaffected by the artist's creativity, but the language itself 
becomes infused with the presence of its artificer. The converse also obtains, 
for in keeping with the concept of negation Shem's artifice is self-consuming or 
at least self-translating. Not only are his materials participating in a continuing 
cycle—living organism, nourishment, waste, basic elements, living organism-
he too participates in a parallel system. He is, after all, "this Esuan Menschavik 
and the first till last alshemist [who] wrote over every square inch of the only 
foolscap available, his own body, till by its corrosive sublimation one continu-
ous present tense integument slowly unfolded all marryvoising moodmoulded 
cyclewheeling history" (186. 34-187. 02). Thus, in viewing the artist's words we 
confront the "him"—his essence implanted in the language—and the "not him"— 
art now existing independent of its creator. We read contradictions into our 
texts as they emerge from the printed pages before us. 
Evidence from the various stages of the writing process asserts that this 
condition exists throughout the work and not simply in isolated instances. The 
drafts, manuscripts, and page proofs of the closing segment of the chapter give 
some idea of how this sense of duality, this blurring of differences evolved dur-
ing the writing process. The holograph of the opening of Mercius's speech 
reads as follows: "Parriah, Cannibal Cain you oathily forsworn the womb that 
bore you & the paps you sometimes sucked."11 The passage goes on to trace 
Mercius's response to the condemnation of Justius, which gives back impreca-
tion with the same harshness of Justius. At the next stage of composition, the 
transition version, the direction of the assault becomes diffused with the substi-
tution of I for the first and third you: "Pariah, cannibal Cain, I who oathily for-
swore the womb that bore you and the paps I sometimes sucked . .." (J]A 47, 
480). As the work continues to evolve, the pronounced shift in emphasis from 
polar antipathy to shared guilt allows the reader to see a greater variety in the 
natures of both characters and destroys the dichotomy of opposition which 
goes against the nature of the rest of the chapter. This both/and quality, simul-
taneously assaulting and enhancing the nature of the individual consciousness, 
allows the possibility for metamorphoses like that of Mercius to ALP in the final 
pages of the chapter to take place, and equally it makes that change as 
transient as any text constructed outside the printed page by the imagination 
of a reader. 
1
 ' The James Joyce Archive, ed. Michael Groden (New York: Garland Publishing, 1978) 47: 383. 
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Confronting any portion of Finnegans Wake throws into relief the relation-
ships that obtain between author, artifact, and reader. The process of creation 
and recreation which normally takes place at the subliminal level of compre-
hension becomes an overt act in the individual's effort to create a text from the 
work, and, to a degree that goes well beyond those narratives of a more conven-
tional design, Finnegans Wake compels one to undertake exploitive reading. 
While most critics have accepted the first stage of this process, the challenge 
to retain that characteristic in their interpretations remains: to offer their own 
readers the same options for extension that are posed by Joyce's work. 
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